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I. INTRODUCTION 
 After decades of financial decadence and total dominance over 
political processes, coal companies have hit desperate times.  Cheap, 
abundant natural gas recently emerged, driving demand for coal for 
energy production and coal prices down.1  The United States 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) finally moved to more stringent 
emissions limitations for coal-fired power plants under the Clean Air 
Act.2  Concurrently, the public demanded improvements in safety 
technology after several tragic mining accidents resulted from lax safety 
measures and a corporate culture of recklessness.3 
 During this time, environmental citizen groups worked to ensure 
that mining companies no longer violated the Clean Water Act (CWA), 
particularly with the mountaintop removal (MTR) mining method.  
Mining companies that previously enjoyed lax enforcement of water 
violations by state environmental protection agencies and the EPA can no 
longer discharge unlawful levels of pollutants into streams without facing 
lawsuits by citizen groups.4  Mining companies pay steep penalties for 
these violations.5  Courts are increasingly skeptical of the practice of 
MTR and its compatibility with the CWA, concluding that what the law 
                                                 
 1. Mark Jaffe, Gas Moves in on Coal, DENVER POST, Oct. 23, 2009, at B5; Steven 
Mufson, Alpha Natural Resources Will Close 8 Mines, Lay Off Hundreds, WASH. POST, Sept. 19, 
2012, at A16. 
 2. Elizabeth Weise, Air Quality Rules Go into Effect, USA TODAY (Dec. 22, 2011), 
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/MONEY/usaedition/2011-12-22-mercury-rule_ST_U.htm. 
 3. See Steven Mufson, Coal Firms’ Profits Fall as the Cost of Mining Increases, WASH. 
POST, Oct. 26, 2012, at A17. 
 4. See Dan Lowrey, Arch Coal Agrees To Settle Selenium Pollution Suite for $2M, SNL 
COAL REPORT, Oct. 10, 2011, available at http://www.lexisnexis.com. 
 5. See David A. Fahrenthold, Mining Giant To Pay $20 Million EPA Fine:  Runoff 
Polluted Waters in W. Va., Ky., WASH. POST, Jan. 18, 2008, at A16; Arch Coal Clean Water Act 
Settlement, EPA, http://www2.epa.gov/enforcement/arch-coal-clean-water-act-settlement (last 
visited Nov. 25, 2013); Jeffrey Tomich, Patriot Coal Agrees To Settle Selenium Pollution Claims, 
ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Jan. 19, 2012), http://www.stltoday.com/business/local/patriot-coal-
agrees-to-settle-selenium-pollution-claims/article)3fa1908e-422b-11e1-92bc-0019bb30f31a.html.  
The author notes that she represented West Virginia in the finalization of United States v. Arch 
Coal, Inc., 829 F. Supp. 2d 408 (S.D. W. Va. 2011), but she was not involved in the negotiation or 
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requires is sometimes contrary to “substantial scientific evidence.”6  
Academic research on stream form and function concluded that streams 
buried through MTR cannot be adequately mitigated or replaced by man-
made streams under United States Army Corps of Engineers permitting.7  
Coal companies rely upon stream mitigation as an essential component 
for the continued viability of MTR. 
 The environmental challenges over the last decade have been 
expensive.  Mine site water treatment costs millions of dollars to 
construct and operate.8  Several large coal companies have posted 
significant quarterly losses.9  One large company has filed for 
bankruptcy and agreed to cease MTR mining.10  Layoffs abound.11  
Despite the grim outlook for coal companies, Appalachian coal-mining 
states face worse situations. 
 Throughout this century, West Virginia has relied upon the taxes and 
jobs provided through coal mining.  West Virginia’s blind faith that coal 
mining would always “keep the lights on” may very well lead the state 
with some of the oldest,12 poorest,13 and unhealthiest14 residents in the 
                                                 
 6. See, e.g., Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal., Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 883 F. Supp. 2d 
627, 645 (S.D. W. Va. 2012). 
 7. See Emily S. Bernhardt & Margaret A. Palmer, The Environmental Costs of 
Mountaintop Mining Valley Fill Operations for Aquatic Ecosystems of the Central Appalachians, 
1223 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 39, 39-40 (2011); Michael B. Griffith et al., The Effects of 
Mountaintop Mines and Valley Fills on the Physiochemical Quality of Stream Ecosystems in the 
Central Appalachians:  A Review, SCI. TOTAL ENV’T, Feb. 15, 2012, at 1, 10; see also Kyle J. 
Hartman et al., How Much Do Valley Fills Influence Headwater Streams?, 532 HYDROBIOLOGIA 
91, 91-102 (2005); T. Ty Lindberg et al., Cumulative Impacts of Mountaintop Mining on an 
Appalachian Watershed, 108 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 20,929, 20,929 (2011); Natasha Gilbert, 
Mountain Mining Damages Streams, 466 NATURE 806, 806 (2010). 
 8. Ken Ward Jr., Alpha To Spend $50 Million on Selenium Cleanups, CHARLESTON 
GAZETTE (Dec. 13, 2011), http://www.wvgazette.com/News/201112120123; Barry Cassell, 
Patriot Says Selenium Court Ruling Will Cost It $50 Million, SNL COAL REPORT, Oct. 25, 2010, 
available at http://www.lexisnexis.com; Press Release, EPA, Consol To Pay $5.5 Million To Settle 
Clean Water Act Violations (Mar. 14, 2001), http://yosemite.epa.gov/opa/admpress.nsf/0/16876ff 
1c4fafa4385257853005cf373?OpenDocument (noting $200 million pollution clean-up initiative). 
 9. Dan Lowrey, CONSOL Expects 1st Loss Since 2007 on Coal Mine Idlings, 
Operational Troubles, SNL COAL REPORT, Oct. 22, 2012, available at http://www.lexisnexis.com; 
Dan Lowrey, Patriot Coal Reports Hefty Q2 Loss on Asset Retirement Charges, Slumping 
Revenues, SNL COAL REPORT, Aug. 10, 2012, available at http://www.lexisnexis.com; Janet 
Patton, Arch Coal Lays Off Nearly 600 Kentucky Miners, LEXINGTON HERALD-LEADER (June 21, 
2012), http://www.kentucky.com/2012/06/21/2233013/arch-coal-lays-off-500-kentucky.html. 
 10. Bill Archer, Patriot Coal To Stop Mountaintop Removal Mining, BLUEFIELD DAILY 
TELEGRAPH, Nov. 16, 2012, at 1; Jeffrey Tomich, Patriot Coal Declares Bankruptcy, ST. LOUIS 
POST-DISPATCH, July 10, 2012, at M1. 
 11. Mufson, supra note 1; Patton, supra note 9; Erich Schwartzel, CONSOL Idles Coal 
Operations, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Mar. 8, 2012, at C1. 
 12. See Paul J. Nyden, W.Va. Faces Possible Caregiver Shortage, CHARLESTON GAZETTE 
(June 19, 2011), http://www.wvgazette.com/News/201106191318; Dan Sewell, Appalachia’s 
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nation into even harder times.  West Virginia now faces a very real 
possibility that it will be solely responsible for liabilities estimated to 
exceed $1.925 trillion and potentially exceed $10 trillion, a conservative 
estimate for 20 years of treatment of the pollutant selenium alone if the 
coal industry collapses.15 
 Setting aside the potential risk of wholesale selenium treatment, 
West Virginia currently estimates that it will need $33.1 million for 
capital construction costs and $6 million in annual treatment costs to 
treat water pollution discharges at just those existing sites that previous 
mining companies have already abandoned.16  That estimate does not take 
into account the potential for a plethora of future abandoned sites or the 
likelihood of industry-wide bankruptcies.  The existing abandoned sites 
will need treatment by the state for at least the next 35 years.17  At the end 
of 2012, the West Virginia Special Reclamation Water Fund (Water 
Fund) had a total of $9.4 million in assets.18  There are 553 permits in 
West Virginia requiring treatment by the state.19  The number of new sites 
requiring treatment by the state has increased steadily since 2001.20 
 This Article evaluates the viability of the Water Fund in light of 
recent federal court decisions that require West Virginia to issue permits 
to itself under the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System 
(NPDES) structure of the CWA for abandoned mine sites subject to the 
federal Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act (SMCRA).21 
                                                                                                                  
 13. Louise Boyle, If You Live in West Virginia, Look Away Now!  The Most and Least 
Livable States in America (and If You’re Thinking of Moving, Utah Is the Best Place To Be), 
MAIL ONLINE (Aug. 13, 2012), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2187547/if-live-west-
virginia-look-away-the-livable-states-america.html; Michael B. Sauter et al., America’s Richest 
(and Poorest) States, 24/7 WALL ST. (Sept. 19, 2013), http://247wallst.com/special-report/2013/09/ 
19/americas-richest-and-poorest-states/7/ (ranking West Virginia the forty-eighth poorest state). 
 14. Boyle, supra note 13; Jared Hunt, Report Says Healthier Choices Would Cut W. Va.’s 
Costs, CHARLESTON DAILY MAIL, Jan. 18, 2012, at 2A. 
 15. See Paul Ziemkiewicz, Estimated Cost of Selenium Treatment at West Virginia Active 
Mining Sites Using Zero Valent Iron and Fluidized Bed Reactor Technology 7 (Oct. 3, 2010) 
(unpublished report) (on file with author). 
 16. Special Reclamation Fund Advisory Council, Report of the Special Reclamation 
Fund Advisory Council 15 (Jan. 31, 2012) (unpublished report) (on file with author). 
 17. Id. at 17. 
 18. Special Reclamation Fund Advisory Council, Report of the Special Reclamation 
Fund Advisory Council 16 (Jan. 9, 2013) (unpublished report) (on file with author). 
 19. Id. at 6. 
 20. See id. at 24. 
 21. See, e.g., W. Va. Highlands Conservancy, Inc. v. Huffman (Huffman I), 625 F.3d 159 





2013] WATER POLLUTION FROM COAL MINING 5 
 
II. DESIGNED TO FAIL—THE DEFICIENCIES IN WEST VIRGINIA’S 
RECLAMATION BONDING AND SPECIAL RECLAMATION TAX 
STRUCTURES 
 Coal mining wreaks havoc on the environment.  A coal operator 
blasts, digs, and extracts tons of waste material in order to access a seam 
of coal, which may be only a few feet thick.  The process exposes 
material that has lain dormant within the earth for millions of years to 
modern day elements.  Pollutants such as iron, aluminum, arsenic, 
manganese, and selenium leach out of the earth in elevated 
concentrations that never would have been released under natural 
conditions.  Rainwater and groundwater serve as vehicles to move these 
CWA-recognized pollutants from the mine site to water bodies.  What 
nature has tucked away and isolated from the world over millions of 
years, man permanently exposes to the elements in seconds. 
 Congress itself recognized the environmental dangers inherent in 
coal mining.  In an attempt to balance the environmental needs of the 
country with the economic ones, Congress enacted SMCRA in 1978.22  
States have no authority to regulate surface mining unless the federal 
Office of Surface Mining (OSM) Reclamation and Enforcement finds 
that the state has established and maintains an appropriate state 
program—one that is at least as stringent as federal law.  The federal 
government delegated authority to West Virginia in 1981.23  As a primacy 
state, West Virginia has the authority to enforce its own SMCRA 
program, which is the West Virginia Surface Coal Mining Reclamation 
Act (SCMRA).24  The West Virginia Department of Environmental 
Protection administers this program through its Division of Mining and 
Reclamation (WVDMR), along with the water program for mining 
permits.  West Virginia must implement its state program laws and 
regulations so that West Virginia’s program is no less stringent than the 
federal SMCRA. 
 Much of SMCRA’s requirements deal with reclamation, out of 
concern for abandoned or unreclaimed mine sites.  West Virginia’s 
program requires that mining operators reclaim mined lands and restore 
the sites to a condition capable of supporting the uses that it could 
support before mining or to “higher and better uses.”25  The mine 
                                                 
 22. 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (2006). 
 23. Conditional Approval of the Permanent Program Submission from the State of West 
Virginia Under the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, 46 Fed. Reg. 5915 
(Jan. 21, 1981). 
 24. W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 22-3-1 to -33 (LexisNexis 2009). 
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operators must create reclamation plans to meet these use requirements.26  
Through the structure of SMCRA, WVDMR must approve all 
reclamation plans prior to issuing a SCMRA permit.  Through the CWA, 
a separate federal law with state counterparts, mine operators and land 
owners must meet water quality standards (WQS) in discharges of water 
from mine sites.27  Reclamation plans must ensure that the mine sites do 
not create water pollution problems.28  SMCRA does not relieve a mine 
operator of its CWA responsibilities. 
 In order to ensure that a mine operator does not leave the state with 
unreclaimed lands, SMCRA requires that mine operators post a 
performance bond in an amount “sufficient to assure the completion of 
the reclamation plan” if West Virginia has to complete the reclamation.29  
West Virginia’s program is an alternative bonding system.  This structure 
is composed of bonding and a taxation system based on the number of 
tons of coal extracted from the state.  West Virginia’s program allows a 
site-specific performance bond that “shall reflect the relative potential 
cost of reclamation associated with” the mining activities.30  The 
legislature established in 1991 that site-specific reclamation bonds could 
not exceed $5000 per acre.31  There is no inflationary adjustment for 
bonding.  Moreover, the legislature has not adjusted the bond ceiling of 
$5000 per acre since 1991, even after MTR became the primary mining 
method of choice and the higher costs associated with water pollution 
from mine sites became apparent to the industry and the state. 
 If a mining company mines the site, adequately reclaims the land, 
and sufficiently meets water quality standards on any discharges 
emanating from the site, then WVDMR releases the bond and the inquiry 
ends there.32  However, if a mining company goes bankrupt or is 
otherwise unable or unwilling to remediate the site sufficiently, the mine 
company forfeits its bond.33  As discussed later in this Article, WVDMR 
must then remediate the site and treat any of the discharges to meet 
WQS.34  If the forfeited bond money was not sufficient to pay for the 
                                                 
 26. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 22-3-10. 
 27. See 33 U.S.C. § 1313 (2006). 
 28. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 22-3-10. 
 29. 30 U.S.C. § 1259; W. VA. CODE ANN. § 22-3-11. 
 30. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 22-3-12. 
 31. Id.  This Code section superseded the prior Code section (W. Va. Code § 22A-3-11), 
which was the bonding section promulgated in 1991.  The bonding ranges have remained the 
same from 1991 through the present. 
 32. Id. § 22-3-23. 
 33. Id. § 22-3-17(b). 
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expenses incurred by WVDMR to remediate, then money must be 
withdrawn from one of two funds established to remediate unreclaimed 
sites:  the West Virginia Special Reclamation Fund (SRF) or the Water 
Fund.35 
 The SRF and the Water Fund are funded through taxes on the 
industry for the extraction of coal within the state.  When the program 
first began, only one fund existed.  Coal operators initially paid $0.03 per 
ton of coal extracted into the SRF.36  Under the SRF, $0.03 per ton was 
supposedly adequate to cover all abandoned mine sites for land and water 
treatment after bond forfeiture.  By statute, WVDMR could spend no 
more than 25% of the SRF amount for water treatment annually.37  This 
severely limited WVDMR’s ability to treat water from abandoned mine 
sites. 
 Over time, the cost of treating the existing water problems grew.  
Each year, WVDMR was required to submit an actuarial report to the 
legislature so that the legislature could assess the financial viability of the 
SRF and increase tax rates accordingly.38  Apparently sensing that the tax 
rates would have to dramatically increase from $0.03 per ton to treat the 
water liabilities from acid mine drainage (AMD), WVDMR instructed 
the actuarial firm that the state had no legal duty to treat water at 
abandoned sites.39  Consequently, the actuarial report addressed the 
viability of the SRF as though WVDMR had no duty to treat the water.  
Because the actuarial report deemed the SRF fiscally sound (and due to 
political pressure), the legislature did not increase the reclamation tax.  
This went on for several decades. 
 In reality, the SRF was woefully underfunded from the beginning.  
In the mid-1980s, the federal General Accounting Office concluded that 
West Virginia’s reclamation bonds only paid 46% of the actual costs of 
reclamation after bond forfeiture.40  By 1989, actual remediation costs 
exceeded $2000 per acre, but permit bonds covered only $1000 per 
acre.41  West Virginia and the OSM estimated a $6.2 million liability to 
                                                 
 35. See West Virginia ex rel. W. Va. Highlands Conservancy, Inc. v. W. Va. Div. of Envtl. 
Prot., 447 S.E.2d 920, 925 (W. Va. 1994). 
 36. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 22A-3-11 (1990) (superseded by W. VA. CODE ANN. § 22-3-11). 
 37. West Virginia ex rel. Laurel Mountain/Fellowsville Area Clean Watershed Ass’n v. 
Callaghan, 418 S.E.2d 580, 584 (W. Va. 1992). 
 38. See W. Va. Highlands Conservancy, 447 S.E.2d at 922 n.9. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Craig B. Giffin, West Virginia’s Seemingly Eternal Struggle for a Fiscally and 
Environmentally Adequate Coal Mining Reclamation Bonding Program, 107 W. VA. L. REV. 105, 
134 (2004). 
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remediate existing abandoned sites.42  In 1991, OSM threatened to take 
over West Virginia’s SMCRA program because of the bonding 
deficiencies.43 
 In 1992, environmental groups successfully won an appeal to the 
Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia, where the court determined 
that the state had a nondiscretionary duty to treat water discharges from 
abandoned mine sites.44  In ruling against the state for its failure to treat 
AMD at a forfeited site, the court stressed to the state the importance of 
proper reclamation bonding by stating, “We note that this case illustrates 
the need for the bonds to be set at levels that are sufficient to cover the 
costs associated with accomplishing completion of reclamation.”45 
 West Virginia did not heed the West Virginia Supreme Court’s 
warning.  In 1994, West Virginia’s liabilities grew to $22.2 million and 
that amount did not include water treatment.46  Environmental groups 
again sued WVDMR, alleging the SRF and the reclamation tax were 
inadequate.47  In its ruling, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West 
Virginia found that the state had a “mandatory, nondiscretionary duty to 
utilize moneys from the SRF, up to 25% of the annual amount” to treat 
discharges to applicable WQS.48  WVDMR had to treat the water at the 
mine sites with the money it had available. 
 In 1995, OSM determined that West Virginia’s abandoned mine 
liabilities were approximately $62 million.49  OSM disapproved parts of 
West Virginia’s SMCRA program regarding abandoned mine bonding 
and funding.50  That same year, WVDMR recommended that the 
legislature remove the $5000-per-acre cap.51  Forfeited bonds routinely 
failed to cover the cost to reclaim the land.  To this day, the West Virginia 
legislature has never adjusted the cap.  In 1998, WVDMR issued a report 
to the West Virginia legislature that the long-term liabilities for 
abandoned mines “would grow geometrically to a maximum of $53 
                                                 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. at 135. 
 44. West Virginia ex rel. Laurel Mountain/Fellowsville Area Clean Watershed Ass’n v. 
Callaghan, 418 S.E.2d 580, 585 (W. Va. 1992). 
 45. Id. at 585 n.10. 
 46. W. Va. Highlands Conservancy v. Norton, 137 F. Supp. 2d 687, 694 (S.D. W. Va. 
2001). 
 47. See id. at 691. 
 48. West Virginia ex rel. W. Va. Highlands Conservancy, Inc. v. W. Va. Div. of Envtl. Prot., 
447 S.E.2d 920, 925 (W. Va. 1994). 
 49. Giffin, supra note 40, at 139. 
 50. Id. 
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million after five years” and admitted that such growth was “fiscally 
irresponsible.”52 
 By 2000, OSM determined that WVDMR paid an average of nearly 
$3000 per acre to reclaim mine sites, but from 1992-2000 the average 
bond was only $700.53  In 2001, the legislature increased that tax from 
$0.03 per ton to $0.07 per ton.54  In addition, the legislature created a 
“temporary tax” of $0.07 to go into the SRF.55  The legislature also 
created an eight-member Special Reclamation Fund Advisory Council56 
that would ensure the “effective, efficient and financially stable operation 
of the [SRF].”57  The Council must provide the legislature with an annual 
report, in conjunction with an actuarial report, and make recommenda-
tions on the stability of the SRF and the amount of the reclamation tax.58 
 During its 2005 assessment, the Council recognized that if the 
temporary tax expired, the SRF would result in “nearly immediate 
insolvency.”59  The legislature enacted another temporary tax, at $0.074 
per ton, making the total tax $0.144 per ton of coal mined.60  The 
legislature required the $0.074 be allocated between the SRF and a newly 
created Water Fund.61  The Water Fund received less than $0.074 per ton 
of coal mined for outstanding and future water treatment at all 
abandoned mine sites in the state.62  By 2011, the legislature removed the 
temporary tax, and the Water Fund only received $0.015 per ton of clean 
coal extracted, even as water treatment costs escalated.63  The changes in 
the tax requirements were largely due to the uncertainty of the costs of 
water remediation.64  In 2012, at the recommendation of the Council, the 
                                                 
 52. Id. at 138 (quoting W. VA. DIV. OF ENVTL. PROT., DEP’T OF COMMERCE, LABOR, & 
ENVTL. RES., ACID MINE DRAINAGE BOND FORFEITURE REPORT 1 (1993) (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
 53. Id. at 142. 
 54. Special Reclamation Advisory Council, supra note 16, at 6. 
 55. Id. 
 56. The Council is composed of eight members:  a representative from the Secretary of 
the Department of Environmental Protection, a representative from the Treasurer’s Office, the 
Director of the National Mine Land Reclamation Center at West Virginia University, a member 
representing the interests of the coal industry, a member representing the interests of 
environmental protection organizations, the interests of the coal miners, and the interests of the 
general public.  W. VA. CODE ANN. § 22-1-17 (LexisNexis 2009).  From at least 2010 to the 
present, the position of the representative for the interests of the general public has been vacant. 
 57. Special Reclamation Advisory Council, supra note 16, at 6. 
 58. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 22-1-17. 
 59. Special Reclamation Advisory Council, supra note 16, at 6. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. See id. 
 63. Id. at 2. 
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legislature increased the tax dedicated to the Water Fund to $0.15 per 
ton.65 
III. THE STATE MUST REMEDIATE RECLAMATION SITES TO MEET THE 
REQUIREMENTS OF THE CWA 
 In utilizing the Water Fund, WVDMR prioritized the list of sites it 
would treat.66  It assessed the sites with the most serious pollution 
problems and treated the discharges.  Under the CWA (and West 
Virginia’s state program), any person who discharges pollutants, 
including the West Virginia Department of Environmental Protection 
(WVDEP) at abandoned sites, must obtain an NPDES permit.67  The 
definition of “person” includes the state and state agencies.68  The 
NPDES permit must set limits so that the discharge of pollutants does 
not violate WQS in waters of the state.  WQS protect the uses of state 
waters for a variety of purposes:  aquatic life, human health, public water 
supply, agriculture and wildlife uses, water supply for industrial use, and 
water contact recreation.69  WQS represent the level of pollutants that can 
exist in a water body while maintaining a healthy water body. 
 Prior to 2011, WVDMR did not treat water from abandoned sites so 
that the discharges would meet WQS.  WVDMR did not issue itself 
NPDES permits.  Instead, WVDMR treated the sites to a lesser standard, 
which also required less expensive treatment.  This lesser standard was 
not necessarily protective of the uses of the state water bodies. 
 WVDMR continued to report its expenditures and potential 
liabilities to the Council.  WVDMR’s position was that it did not have to 
employ expensive treatment operations to meet WQS.70  During this time, 
the legislature did not increase water reclamation tax rates to account for 
the appropriate water treatment costs.  Mining continued in the state, 
with coal companies paying between $0.015 and $0.074 per ton of coal 
to cover the cost to the state of treating water from abandoned mines. 
 Once again, environmental and public interest groups were 
concerned about the fiscal health of the Water Fund and WVDMR’s 
                                                 
 65. Id. at 3; W. VA. CODE ANN. § 22-3-11(i)(1)(B) (2013), available at http://www.legis. 
state.wv.us/wvcode/ChapterEntire.cfm?chap=22&art=3&section=11. 
 66. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 22-3-11. 
 67. Id. § 22-11-3; 40 C.F.R. § 122.21(a) (2012). 
 68. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 22-11-3; 40 C.F.R. § 122.2. 
 69. W. VA. CODE R. § 47-2-6 (2011). 
 70. See generally Huffman I, 625 F.3d 159 (4th Cir. 2010), aff’g 588 F. Supp. 2d 678 
(N.D. W. Va. 2009); W. Va. Highlands Conservancy, Inc. v. Huffman (Huffman II), 651 F. Supp. 
2d 512 (S.D. W. Va. 2009); W. Va. Highlands Conservancy, Inc. v. Huffman (Huffman III), 588 F. 
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treatment of unreclaimed sites.  In 2007, environmental groups filed a 
pair of lawsuits regarding the Water Fund in both federal judicial districts 
in West Virginia.71  These groups argued that in executing its “mandatory, 
nondiscretionary duty” to treat abandoned mine sites to applicable WQS, 
WVDMR failed to (1) issue NPDES permits for its discharges as the 
operator of discharges of pollutants under the CWA and (2) treat water 
discharges to meet WQS.72  As in the previous SRF case, the 
environmental groups were concerned that the reclamation water tax was 
based upon WVDMR spending less money on water treatment because 
those cheaper treatments did not meet WQS.  Mine companies, 
particularly MTR mine operators, paid less in reclamation taxes because 
the Water Fund was inadequately capitalized.  Environmental groups 
were also concerned that water quality in the state was impacted by 
WVDMR’s failure to treat abandoned mine sites adequately. 
 The environmental groups argued that the CWA required WVDMR 
to permit its own discharges and meet WQS because it was an operator 
of a discharge of pollutants.73  WVDMR claimed that it was exempt from 
the CWA because it was a state entity and that it was not the original 
operator of the site, an argument that had never been accepted by any 
court in a CWA case.74  This argument was also contrary to WVDEP’s 
long-established practice of permitting state entities like the West 
Virginia Transportation Division of Highways, the West Virginia Division 
of Corrections, the West Virginia Department of Education, and other 
state agencies outside of mining, who not only received NPDES permits, 
but also paid penalties to WVDEP for violations. 
 On appeal, WVDMR argued that the state “simply cannot comply” 
with WQS because of the “hefty costs.”75  WVDMR argued that it was 
not simply a matter of increasing the reclamation tax.76  WVDMR 
claimed that if the state had to comply with WQS like every other 
discharger of pollutants, it would constitute a raid on West Virginia’s 
treasury.77  West Virginia had failed to require financial assurance from 
both the mine operators through appropriate bonding and the mining 
industry through a feasible reclamation tax.  As a result, the state could 
                                                 
 71. Huffman II, 651 F. Supp. 2d 512; Huffman III, 588 F. Supp. 2d 678. 
 72. See Huffman II, 651 F. Supp. 2d at 516; Huffman III, 588 F. Supp. 2d at 680. 
 73. See Huffman II, 651 F. Supp. 2d at 516; Huffman III, 588 F. Supp. 2d at 684. 
 74. Huffman II, 651 F. Supp. 2d at 522 n.6; Huffman III, 588 F. Supp. 2d at 691-92. 
 75. Huffman I, 625 F.3d at 169. 
 76. Reply Brief of Appellant at 9, Huffman I, 625 F.3d 159 (No. 09-1474), 2009 WL 
3240503. 
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not afford to abate the problems—contrary to the entire purpose of 
SMCRA. 
 In essence, WVDMR admitted that the same mine reclamation 
plans that the state had permitted and certified as meeting WQS, bonded 
for amounts that allegedly assured compliance of those WQS, and then 
taxed through the Water Fund to further pay for liabilities, were actually 
false.  The mining companies had provided bonds that were insufficient 
to pay for treatment to ensure that these sites would discharge only 
legally acceptable levels of pollutants and protect West Virginia’s waters.  
Through its arguments, WVDMR indirectly admitted that its permitting, 
bonding, and reclamation tax systems left West Virginia at risk for vast 
underfunded liabilities and certain water pollution.  The bonds and the 
taxes that mining companies paid were insufficient for the state to treat 
water to appropriate levels of pollutants before discharging into streams 
under the WQS, as required by the West Virginia state water program and 
the CWA. 
 Just as revealing were the arguments by the Interstate Mining 
Compact Commission (IMCC), whose members are coal mining states.  
IMCC admitted that the bonds in all of its member states were 
insufficient to pay for the treatment of water for perpetual pollution 
control.78  IMCC wanted the court to find in WVDMR’s favor because 
the states simply did not have the money to pay for the treatment.79 
 Without even acknowledging that each member state was admitting 
that it failed to meet the requirements necessary to have a state SMCRA 
program, IMCC justified this financing failure by stating, “[T]he bond 
amount would not generally cover the costs of any post-mining 
pollutional discharge because the permit would not be issued if the 
mining activity is expected to cause such a discharge.”80  As discussed 
later in this Article, it is unequivocally false to say that states do not issue 
                                                 
 78. Brief of the Interstate Mining Compact Commission as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Appellant Randy Huffman, Seeking Reversal of the Decision Below at 11, Huffman I, 625 F.3d 
159 (No. 09-1474) [hereinafter Amicus Curiae Brief]. 
 79. See id.  Although this Article focuses on West Virginia bonding, similar problems 
may exist in other Appalachian surface-mining states.  Virginia only requires that the bond be at 
least $10,000 per bond and “sufficient to assure the completion of the reclamation plan,” with no 
further monetary instructions.  VA. CODE ANN. § 45.1-241 (2013).  OSM threatened to take over 
Kentucky’s program, and the state revised its bonding amounts to “not less than $500 nor more 
than $3,000 for each acre or fraction thereof of the area of land affected, with a minimum bond 
of $5,000, conditioned upon the faithful performance of the requirements.”  405 KY. ADMIN. 
REGS. 1:050 (2013).  Tennessee does not have primacy, so the bonding program is executed 
through OSM, which requires a sufficient amount to complete reclamation and no less than 
$10,000 per bond.  30 C.F.R. § 800.14 (2012).  OSM has not revised its regulations even though 
the problems associated with MTR and perpetual pollution have been apparent for many years. 
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SMCRA permits if there will be postmining pollution discharges.  States 
have issued a myriad of SMCRA permits where the mine sites now 
discharge selenium, sulfates, conductive particulates, suspended solids, 
dissolved solids, illegal levels of acidic solutions, iron, aluminum, and 
manganese into the indefinite future.  Those mining companies are now 
implementing pollution controls upwards of $50 million at individual 
sites to treat perpetual pollution.  West Virginia and other Appalachian 
coal-mining states will inherit the same liabilities if those mine operators 
fail in their reclamation efforts or become insolvent because the sites will 
continue to discharge pollutants long after the profits from these 
companies are gone.  The impropriety of issuing such perpetual pollution 
permits will bankrupt the reclamation program in West Virginia, as well 
as other Appalachian coal-mining states. 
 The courts in both cases found that WVDMR was an operator of 
discharges of pollutants under the CWA.81  The CWA provided no 
exceptions for state agencies.82  As an operator, the CWA required 
WVDMR to obtain NPDES permits to meet all applicable water 
standards.83  The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit 
affirmed the decision that WVDMR needed to obtain NPDES permits 
and meet WQS.84  The court was not persuaded by the arguments that 
West Virginia (and the rest of the coal-mining states) should be excused 
from meeting WQS simply because it had failed to collect sufficient 
money from the mining operations, instead choosing for decades to 
subsidize the cost of pollution from this trillion-dollar industry by 
looking the other way.85 
IV. WEST VIRGINIA HAS LIABILITIES FOR CURRENT UNRECLAIMED 
SURFACE MINE SITES 
 As a result of the NPDES cases, West Virginia must utilize money 
from the Water Fund to treat discharges from abandoned mine sites to 
                                                 
 81. Huffman II, 651 F. Supp. 2d 512, 521 (S.D. W. Va. 2009); Huffman III, 588 F. Supp. 
2d 678, 691 (N.D. W. Va. 2009). 
 82. Although not discussed in the case, the West Virginia Water Pollution Control Act, 
specifically title 22, section 11-3, of the West Virginia Code and title 22, section 11-8, likewise 
does not provide an exception for the state or its agencies.  The Act specifically identifies the state 
as a person who must comply with the West Virginia Water Pollution Control Act.  W. VA. CODE 
§§ 22-11-3(15), -8(6) (LexisNexis 2009); see Huffman II, 651 F. Supp. 2d at 518; Huffman III, 
588 F. Supp. 2d at 689, 691. 
 83. Huffman II, 651 F. Supp. 2d at 521; Huffman III, 588 F. Supp. 2d at 691-92. 
 84. Huffman I, 625 F.3d 159, 170 (4th Cir. 2010). 
 85. Id. at 169 (stating the court is “not in the business of rewriting laws whenever parties 
allege it is difficult to comply with them”).  Relief from burdensome permitting requirements lay 
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meet all applicable water standards.  In order to comply with the 
requirements of the federal SMCRA to have a state program, West 
Virginia must have financial assurance “sufficient to assure the 
completion of the reclamation plan.”86  The reclamation plan includes 
meeting CWA requirements.  West Virginia does not satisfy that 
requirement.  West Virginia estimates that the cost to treat all 200 
existing abandoned mine sites forfeited by the end of 2012 is $33.1 
million for capital costs and an additional $6 million in annual operations 
and maintenance costs.87  At the end of 2012, the Water Fund had a total 
of $9.4 million in assets.88 
 West Virginia’s treatment liability estimate is likely underestimated.  
The West Virginia Legislative Auditor audited the SRF and Water Fund 
for the period of July 1, 2009, through June 30, 2010.89  The audit 
detailed numerous issues with the way WVDMR managed the SRF and 
the bonding program.  The audit randomly selected 22 forfeited mine 
sites and found that the reclamation liabilities were consistently 
underestimated.90  This means that the deficit between the costs of current 
abandoned mine treatment and the money in the Water Fund are likely 
far greater than WVDMR has estimated.  The alleged existing gap in 
excess of $24.4 million in capital expenditures and $6 million per year in 
operation and maintenance costs may in reality be a gross underesti-
mation. 
 In 2012, the legislature increased the amount of the Special 
Reclamation Tax, including the amount for the Water Fund.  As of July 1, 
2012, mining companies pay $0.15 per ton of coal extracted into the 
Water Fund.91  The caps on bonding have not increased since 1991.  The 
Water Fund had assets of $8.7 million in 2011; in 2012, after six months 
of increased taxes, it held $9.4 million, an increase of only $700,000.92 
                                                 
 86. 30 U.S.C. § 1259(a) (2006). 
 87. Special Reclamation Advisory Council, supra note 18, at 11.  This estimate was not 
updated since the 2011 Special Reclamation Fund Advisory Council Annual Report.  It is unclear 
whether WVDMR has kept track of new liabilities since its last required report to the federal 
court in 2011, but it seems unlikely that in over a year, the treatment costs would remain 
unchanged. 
 88. Id. at 6. 
 89. LEGISLATIVE POST AUDIT DIV., W. VA. LEGISLATIVE AUDITOR, LEGISLATIVE AUDIT 
REPORT:  WEST VIRGINIA DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION SPECIAL RECLAMATION 
FUNDS & FUND 8796 (2012). 
 90. Id. at 12. 
 91. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 22-3-11 (2013), available at http://www.legis.state.wv.us/wv 
code/ChapterEntire.cfm?chap=22&art=3&section=11. 
 92. Special Reclamation Advisory Council, supra note 18, at 6; Special Reclamation 
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 The 2007 cases on water treatment at reclamation sites arose from 
concerns with WVDMR’s treatment of mining sites with AMD 
problems.93  AMD results in an increase in the pH of water and the 
precipitation of harmful chemicals into streams.94  AMD is a serious 
problem that states across the country have dealt with for many years.  
WVDMR’s liabilities for remediation of AMD are high.95  However, a 
more expensive water treatment liability exists.  These cases did not 
directly deal with the bigger problem lurking behind the concern for the 
Water Fund:  the remediation of forfeited MTR sites. 
V. RECLAMATION OF MTR SITES WILL INCREASE DEFICITS IN THE 
WATER FUND 
 MTR methods vary significantly from underground and traditional 
surface mining techniques in ways that implicate the viability of the 
Water Fund.  The MTR method of mining coal in Appalachia involves 
blasting the soil and rock on top of a mountain to expose coal deposits in 
the upper strata of the mountain.  Mining companies acquire the property 
rights to the mountain and use explosives and large-scale demolition 
equipment to remove the top portion of the mountain to access seams of 
coal.  Mining companies use ammonia nitrate fertilizer and fuel oil to 
blow up mountains, the same mixture used in the Oklahoma City 
bombing, but mine explosions are 10 to 100 times stronger.96 
 MTR destroys all of the trees and vegetation in the process.  Mining 
removes and displaces topsoil as well.  Mining companies remove as 
much as 1000 feet of overburden from the mountain.97  This permanently 
alters the contour of the mountain. 
 When the top of the mountain is removed, not all of the material is 
coal.  Most of the material contains rock and other minerals, which are 
mining spoils or overburden.  For every ton of coal extracted, MTR 
creates 16 tons of overburden.98  Overburden expands when miners 
remove it from the mountain.  Once the overburden is removed and 
                                                 
 93. Huffman II, 651 F. Supp. 2d 512, 515 (S.D. W. Va. 2009); Huffman III, 588 F. Supp. 
2d 678, 683 (N.D. W. Va. 2009). 
 94. Huffman III, 588 F. Supp. 2d at 683. 
 95. See Huffman II, 651 F. Supp. 2d at 529; Huffman III, 588 F. Supp. 2d at 692. 
 96. Julia Fox, Mountaintop Removal in West Virginia:  An Environmental Sacrifice Zone, 
12 ORG. & ENV’T 163, 166 (1999). 
 97. EPA, EPA/600/R-09/138F, THE EFFECTS OF MOUNTAINTOP MINES AND VALLEY FILLS 
ON AQUATIC ECOSYSTEMS OF THE CENTRAL APPALACHIAN COALFIELDS 7 (2011), available at 
http://ofmpub.epa.gov/eims/eimscomm.getfile?P_download_id=501593. 





16 TULANE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 27:1 
 
smashed into smaller pieces, the overburden expands by 30% to 35%.99  
Not all of the overburden will fit back into the reclaimed mountain.  
After recontouring the mine, the mine companies must dispose of 20% to 
25% of extra overburden.100 
 The mining company permanently places this excess overburden in 
another area.  Overburden in Appalachian MTR sites is typically placed 
in valleys, which are natural areas that are lower than the mountain, 
resulting in a “valley fill.”101  A valley fill looks like a dam, but with 
mining waste inside instead of clean water.  Mining destroys springs and 
ephemeral, intermittent, and small perennial streams on the mountain’s 
surface. 
 Rainwater, snowmelt, and natural springs flow into the valley fill 
and filter through the fill material.  As the water flows out of the valley 
fill, it picks up a variety of CWA pollutants, including polycyclic 
aromatic hydrocarbons (PAHs), iron, manganese, selenium, arsenic, and 
a combination of ionic compounds that elevate conductivity levels.102  
This water is collected and discharged into a stream, which constitutes a 
CWA point source that requires an NPDES permit.  Water quality 
standards must be met at the point of discharge.  Thus, pursuant to the 
CWA, whatever water comes out of the fill must meet all applicable 
WQS prior to entering a stream. 
 MTR mining leaves a bigger footprint than traditional mining 
methods.  Because the mine operator creates a mountain-size crater in 
the earth, each MTR site disturbs upwards of 3100 acres.103  Mining 
companies use draglines that cost over $100 million, are as high as a 20-
story building, and weigh 8 million pounds.104  MTR with valley fills has 
disturbed approximately 12 million acres in West Virginia, Kentucky, 
Virginia, and Tennessee.105  In a report issued in 2010, WVDEP used 
Geographic Information Systems (GIS) to quantify the miles of land 
disturbed and loss of streams within the West Virginia mountains.106  The 
analysis identified 1821 spoil fills and 270 refuse fills (usually slurry 
impoundments, which contain pollution from washing impurities and 
                                                 
 99. Syd S. Peng, Mountaintop Removal Controversy Slows West Virginia Coal Mining, 
MINING ENGINEERING, Sept. 2000, at 53, 56. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Griffith et al., supra note 7, at 9. 
 103. Peng, supra note 99, at 53. 
 104. Fox, supra note 96, at 166. 
 105. EPA, supra note 97, at ii. 
 106. Michael Shank, W. Va. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., Trends in Mining Fills and Associated 
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pollutants from the coal prior to sale), totaling 56,780 acres or over 88 
square miles in the coalfields of West Virginia.107  The analysis estimated 
that the fills from MTR resulted in the loss of over 844 miles of 
intermittent and perennial streams.108  The stream loss was relatively 
concentrated, with half of the stream loss occurring within 23 watersheds 
in the state.109  Stream loss exceeded 10% in 14 of these watersheds.110 
 Despite the requirements of SMCRA and the CWA, discharges 
from MTR sites do not comply with WQS.  The illegal discharge of 
pollutants has negatively impacted aquatic life.  Research has found that 
“surface coal mines degrade water quality and substantially alter stream 
biota well downstream of their permit boundaries.”111  MTR sites result in 
elevated fine sediments from valley fills and the erosion of streambeds 
caused by changes in stream flow.112  Streams below valley fills have 
elevated levels of sulfate, nitrate, nitrite, bicarbonate, calcium, 
manganese, potassium, sodium, and chloride ions.113  Valley fills also 
release elevated levels of selenium.114 
 This pollution does not occur in isolation; real impacts to the quality 
of West Virginia’s waters occur.  Loss of aquatic life biodiversity occurs 
in up to 2880 miles of West Virginia streams due to “the propagation of 
surface coal mining pollutants through the regional river network.”115  
Scientists have documented cranial and facial deformities in fish from 
selenium pollution.116  MTR sites continuously release illegal quantities 
of CWA pollutants and destroy and impair aquatic life.  An “EPA study 
found that nine out of every 10 streams downstream from surface 
mining” in Appalachia exhibit significant impacts to aquatic life.117  The 
state may ultimately have to bear the entire cost of treating these sites to 
stop the pollution if it is unable to recover the funds from polluters. 
                                                 
 107. Id. at 3. 
 108. Id. at 7. 
 109. Id. at 9. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Emily S. Bernhardt et al., How Many Mountains Can We Mine?  Assessing the 
Regional Degradation of Central Appalachian Rivers by Surface Coal Mining, 46 ENVTL. SCI. & 
TECH. 8115, 8120 (2012). 
 112. Griffith et al., supra note 7, at 8. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. at 5. 
 115. Bernhardt et al., supra note 111, at 8121. 
 116. Lindberg et al., supra note 7, at 20,932-33. 
 117. Memorandum from Peter S. Silva, Assistant Adm’r for Water, EPA, & Cynthia Giles, 
Assistant Adm’r for Enforcement & Compliance Assurance, EPA, to Shawn Garvin, Reg’l Adm’r, 
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VI. FUTURE RISKS TO THE MINING INDUSTRY AND THE STATE 
 It seems relatively clear that West Virginia’s outstanding liabilities 
on currently abandoned mines exceed the money collected from those 
forfeited bonds and the existing money in the Water Fund.  What if more 
sites are forfeited?  Can the money held in current bonds adequately pay 
for future water liabilities? 
 Substantial obstacles block a comprehensive evaluation of West 
Virginia’s potential liabilities.  The West Virginia Legislative audit found 
that WVDMR “consistently improperly calculated” the bond amounts for 
mining permits, “which would result in permits being under-bonded.”118  
This underbonding occurs partly because the legislature has continuously 
refused to raise the $5000-per-acre cap since 1991.  In addition, 
WVDMR consistently bonds sites below the $5000 ceiling.  The audit 
attempted to analyze 1764 bonds, but could not obtain “relevant, reliable 
reports” from the WVDMR and could not determine whether the bonds 
were properly calculated.119 
 The audit also criticized WVDMR’s practice of allowing self-
bonding from mining companies.  The audit noted that it was not able to 
obtain reliable information from the WVDMR’s system.  It found that 
one self-bonded mining company was bonded for over $174 million.120  
However, the documentation showed that the mining company was 
approved for financial assurance of only $125 million.121  This would 
leave West Virginia with $49 million in liability that the company may 
not be able to pay. 
 WVDMR’s response on self-bonding was especially enlightening 
and frightening.  WVDMR corrected the auditor’s initial report by 
identifying Massey Energy and Alpha Natural Resources (the company 
that purchased Massey) as the self-insured entity.  WVDMR stated that 
after the merger, Alpha Natural Resources had over $186 million in total 
outstanding amounts of self-bonds.122  WVDMR further stated that Alpha 
Natural Resources is approved for $375 million in self-bonds, as if that 
should provide confidence in the self-bonding process.123  The fact that 
WVDMR evaluates $375 million in self-bonded risk for one company 
(one that is now suffering significant quarterly losses) speaks volumes 
                                                 
 118. LEGISLATIVE POST AUDIT DIV., supra note 89, at 56. 
 119. Id. at 6 n.1. 
 120. Id. at 58. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. at 115. 
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about WVDMR’s bonding practices and its attitude about surface mining 
in general. 
 The audit criticized the policy of self-bonding as riskier than other 
securities.124  WVDMR’s response was that both surety and bank bonds 
have become insolvent in the past.125  The conclusion by WVDMR—that 
self-bonding, surety bonding, and bank bonding are all susceptible to 
substantial risk of insolvency—should not ease the minds of the citizens 
of West Virginia who have to live with and pay for the pollution of 
surface mining that should have full financial protection under SMCRA. 
VII. POTENTIAL FAILURE IN THE COAL MINING INDUSTRY AND MTR 
METHODS IN PARTICULAR 
 Is the coal industry at risk of a large-scale failure?  Environmental 
groups have exerted intense pressure on the coal industry through 
lawsuits and the enforcement of the CWA.  Surface mining companies 
face a particularly expensive problem with selenium violations. 
 Selenium is a toxic pollutant that bioaccumulates in fish and 
humans.126  The EPA surveyed 78 MTR sites with valley fill streams and 
found that 73 had selenium water concentrations greater than the 
threshold for toxic bioaccumulation.127  Research has confirmed that West 
Virginia streams in mined watersheds have selenium concentrations that 
exceed toxic levels for aquatic life.128  Toxic levels of selenium cause 
embryotic deformities in fish and reproductive failure in fish and birds.129  
As a result, states have issued fish consumption advisories due to 
selenium.130  Selenium is a serious water quality issue in MTR areas, 
especially West Virginia.  Research has documented severe physical 
deformities in two species of fish in the Mud River reservoir,131 which is 
downstream of MTR sites (including Patriot Coal’s behemoth Hobet 21). 
 WVDMR was not ignorant of the problems of selenium.  It just 
chose to look the other way.  West Virginia’s WQS establish quantitative 
in-stream criteria to protect human health (acute criteria) and aquatic life 
(acute and chronic criteria).132  However, WVDMR did not impose or 
                                                 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
 126. M.A. Palmer et al., Mountaintop Mining Consequences, 327 SCIENCE 148, 148 
(2010). 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Lindberg et al., supra note 7, at 20,932-33. 
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enforce selenium limitations on coal mining operations until environ-
mental groups filed lawsuits over selenium violations of WQS.  In 2003, 
EPA recognized selenium as a pollutant of concern in MTR operations.133  
When WVDMR reluctantly included these criteria in permits, WVDMR 
also granted unlimited, indefinite stays to the mining companies, making 
those limitations unenforceable and giving companies no effective 
limits.134  Environmental groups, through lawsuits in federal court, 
eventually stopped that unlawful practice.135 
 The state was aware for many years that coal companies were 
discharging illegal quantities of selenium due to MTR and that the 
mining companies were unwilling to treat, remove, or reduce the 
selenium from its discharges, despite the mandates of state water law and 
the CWA.  In 2009, the legislature itself recognized the issues with 
selenium but questioned whether it was an issue in the state.136  During 
this entire time, WVDMR continued to issue MTR NPDES permits, 
knowing that mining companies would discharge illegal quantities of 
selenium and that sites were not installing selenium treatment 
technology. 
 Based on inadequate enforcement by WVDMR, environmental 
groups challenged the mining companies’ illegal pollution actions.  
These lawsuits were successful.  In 2010, a federal court ordered Patriot 
to invest in selenium treatment at two of its mine sites (Ruffner and 
Hobet 22) in West Virginia after Patriot failed to convince the court that it 
was moving at a reasonable speed towards compliance.137  The court 
ordered Patriot to install fluidized bed reactor treatment (FBR) at the 
Ruffner mine site to achieve compliance with selenium limits by March 
1, 2013.138 
 The court required Patriot to post a $45 million Irrevocable Letter 
of Credit with the court for financial assurance.139  In contrast, Patriot is 
bonded with the state of West Virginia for the Ruffner mine for a total of 
$6,600,640.140  The $6.6 million bond with West Virginia supposedly 
                                                 
 133. See Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal., Inc. v. Coal-Mac, Inc., 775 F. Supp. 2d 900, 905 (S.D. 
W. Va. 2011). 
 134. See id. at 905, 925. 
 135. See, e.g., id. at 929. 
 136. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 22-11-6 (LexisNexis 2009). 
 137. See Order Specifying Relief, Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal., Inc. v. Apogee Coal Co., 744 
F. Supp. 2d 561 (S.D. W. Va. 2010) (No. 07-00413). 
 138. Id. at 1. 
 139. Id. at 2. 
 140. This figure was derived by adding up all outstanding surety bonds (bond numbers 
1015322, 1058001, 8205-64-51, 400SA1616, 1062292, 1062293, 1062294) associated with all 
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represents an adequate amount of money for WVDMR to remediate the 
land and treat the water from the site.  Even after a federal court 
determined that selenium treatment alone at the site will exceed $45 
million, WVDMR is protected from liability only to $6.6 million.  In the 
event that Patriot abandons the site, West Virginia’s liability would be 
over $30 million for the construction of selenium treatment alone.  In its 
required monthly status report to the court on June 10, 2013, Patriot 
disclosed that it has paid over $37 million to date on the project and 
estimates it will cost nearly $10 million more to complete the project.141  
However, Patriot has run into some significant problems with its project.  
As of September 3, 2013, Patriot has notified the court that it has 
problems with the FBR, including a total of seven failures related to 
“excessive wear and pump failures.”142  Additionally, the moving bed 
biofilm reactor has clogging problems, there is “excessive wear” on the 
effluent pumps, and there is “failure of every motor” at the Mudlick 
pumps.143  It appears as though Patriot has significant problems with its 
selenium removal equipment, and fixing those problems sounds 
expensive.  No report to date has been issued on those costs. 
 The court’s foresight to require a bond of $45 million will ensure 
that Patriot (or its successors) will complete up to $45 million in 
construction.144  However, West Virginia remains unprotected for the cost 
of annual operations if Patriot does not successfully emerge from 
bankruptcy.145  Patriot has not disclosed in public filings to the court the 
annual costs for operation and maintenance for its selenium treatment.  
                                                                                                                  
(NPDES permit number WV0099520).  The bond data was acquired from the WVDEP through a 
Freedom of Information Act request by the author, received October 15, 2012, and on file with 
the author.  The permit numbers were retrieved from the Department’s Web site.  Coal/Quarry 
NPDES Application Search, W. VA. DEP’T OF ENVTL. PROT., http://www.dep.wv.gov/insidedep/ 
Pages/coalquarryndpespermitsearch.aspx (enter “WV0099520” into “Permit Number” field; then 
click “Go” button) (last visited Oct. 25, 2013). 
 141. Thirty-Second Monthly Status Report at 3, app. A, Apogee Coal, 744 F. Supp. 2d 561 
(No. 07-00413). 
 142. Id.; Quarterly Status Report at 1, Apogee Coal, 744 F. Supp. 2d 561 (No. 07-00413). 
 143. Thirty-Second Monthly Status Report, supra note 141, at 3; Quarterly Status Report, 
supra note 142, at 1-2. 
 144. Order Specifying Relief, supra note 137, at 1.  In a companion case, the court 
subsequently reduced the letter of credit amount to the amount remaining to complete 
construction on the selenium treatment technologies.  The court has not required a letter of credit 
to ensure that even if Patriot becomes completely insolvent, adequate money remains to actually 
operate the selenium treatment.  See Order at 2, Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal. Inc. v. Hobet Mining, 
LLC, 723 F. Supp. 2d 886 (S.D. W. Va. 2010) (No. 09-01167). 
 145. The author filed a motion to intervene on behalf of an environmental group in a 
settlement involving the same selenium outlets.  The group asked to intervene to request that the 
court establish a letter of credit or funds to protect the state for operating costs.  Because of the 
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However, CH2M Hill, the company that is installing the treatment, 
estimated in 2010 that an FBR would cost $3 million annually for 
operation and maintenance.146  Patriot’s recent serious problems with 
numerous aspects of its selenium removal equipment further illustrates 
the problems WVDMR faces on selenium.147  Installing selenium 
treatment facilities is an exercise in futility if the operator or the state 
cannot afford to properly operate and maintain the systems. 
 Patriot’s selenium treatment obligations are not limited to Hobet 21 
and Ruffner.  In 2012, Patriot Coal settled an environmental group 
lawsuit involving selenium violations, where it agreed to pay the EPA 
$750,000 and an additional $6.75 million to the West Virginia Land Trust 
administered by West Virginia University.148  It also agreed to treat 
selenium to WQS at four of its sites.149 
 In filings with the United States Securities and Exchange 
Commission, Patriot informed its investors that treatment for selenium 
liabilities would cost an estimated $440 million over 30 years.150  Months 
after the selenium settlement, Patriot filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy and 
quickly asked the bankruptcy court for permission to ask the Southern 
District Court of West Virginia for relief from $29 million in 
environmental treatment that it must have implemented to meet 
limitations requirements.151  On January 9, 2013, the court approved a 
settlement152 negotiated between the environmental groups and Patriot 
whereby Patriot would stop MTR mining as a way to make “a reduction 
[in its] environmental footprint.”153  At this point, it is uncertain what will 
happen with that bankruptcy, but it is clear that if Patriot is unable to 
restructure its business into a profitable venture without using MTR 
methods, West Virginia will inherit a large portion of that estimated $440 
                                                 
 146. TOM SANDY & CINDY DISANTE, CH2M HILL, REVIEW OF AVAILABLE TECHNOLOGIES 
FOR THE REMOVAL OF SELENIUM FROM WATER, at xv (2010), http://www.namc.org/docs/00062756. 
PDF. 
 147. See Quarterly Status Report, supra note 142. 
 148. Dan Lowrey, Patriot Reaches Potentially Costly Agreement To Treat Selenium from 
Coal Mines, SNL COAL REPORT, Jan. 23, 2012, available at http://www.lexisnexis.com. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Ken Ward Jr., Patriot Selenium Deal Falls Through, CHARLESTON GAZETTE (Sept. 13, 
2012), http://www.wvgazette.com/News/201209130136. 
 151. Dan Lowrey, Court Allows Patriot To Seek Delay in Implementing Selenium Cleanup 
Plans, SNL COAL REPORT, Oct. 15, 2012, available at http://www.lexisnexis.com. 
 152. Memorandum Opinion and Order at 8, Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal., Inc. v. Patriot Coal 
Corp., No. 11-00115 (S.D. W. Va. dismissed Jan. 9, 2013). 
 153. Ken Ward Jr., Patriot Coal To Phase Out MTR Mining, CHARLESTON GAZETTE, Nov. 
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million in selenium pollution clean-up.  Patriot owns 11 active mines, 
with 9 of those mines located in West Virginia.154 
 West Virginia has not received adequate financial assurance from 
Patriot for these liabilities.  Twenty of the twenty-six Patriot entities that 
filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy have provided WVDMR with surety 
bonds.155  Those bonds total over $158 million, covering over 49,000 
acres of disturbed area (an average of $3200 bonded per acre).156  If 
Patriot’s reorganization is unsuccessful and those sites become 
abandoned, WVDMR’s secured sureties will not cover even half of the 
estimated $440 million in selenium liabilities alone estimated by Patriot 
to its stockholders, even though 75% of Patriot’s active mine sites are 
located in West Virginia.  The bonds must cover remediation for all water 
pollution and land remediation as well. 
 Patriot is far from the only coal company with massive selenium 
treatment liabilities.  In 2010, WVDMR identified 180 outfalls in the 
state as violating selenium limits.157  Alpha Natural Resources settled a 
lawsuit brought by environmental groups for selenium violations at 3 
mine sites for a $4.5 million penalty158 to the West Virginia Land Trust.  
The estimated construction cost to treat selenium was estimated at $50 
million.159  Environmental groups sued Alpha for selenium violations at 
an additional nine mining sites in West Virginia in July 2012.160 
 Arch Coal settled a selenium lawsuit with environmental groups at 
6 mine sites with a $2 million penalty.161  In 2012, Arch also settled a $4 
million lawsuit with the EPA, West Virginia, and Kentucky involving 
other pollutants and an outfall with selenium violations.162  Arch agreed 
to install a passive selenium treatment system as part of the settlement.163  
Arch has not made cost estimates for this treatment available to the 
public. 
                                                 
 154. Operations, PATRIOT COAL, http://www.patriotcoal.com/index.php?view=operation 
s&p=3 (last visited Oct. 25, 2013). 
 155. W. Va. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., Surety Bond Database (Oct. 15, 2012) (unpublished 
spreadsheet) (on file with author) (obtained through a Freedom of Information Act request to 
WVDEP). 
 156. Id. 
 157. Ziemkiewicz, supra note 15, at 2. 
 158. Steve Hooks, Enviros Sue Alpha Natural Resources Anew over Selenium Discharges, 
PLATTS COAL OUTLOOK, July 23, 2012, available at http://www.lexisnexis.com. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Lowrey, supra note 4. 
 162. Arch Coal Clean Water Act Settlement, supra note 5.  The author discloses that she 
was involved in the finalization of this settlement with the court through the representation of 
West Virginia, but was not involved in the negotiations or the actual settlement. 
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 The problems and costs associated with existing MTR should 
concern the state because of the ecological impacts and the risk to the 
Water Fund.  If coal companies abandon MTR sites with selenium 
violations, the state must pay to install and maintain treatment systems to 
reduce pollution.  In 2010, Paul Ziemkiewicz, member of the Special 
Reclamation Advisory Council as the Director of the National Mine 
Land Reclamation Center and researcher at the West Virginia Water 
Research Institute (housed at West Virginia University), finalized a 
research report to the Special Reclamation Advisory Council.164  His 
report assessed the potential risk that West Virginia faces if it has to treat 
selenium at all of the sites identified by WVDMR as being in violation 
of selenium limits in West Virginia.  Ziemkiewicz provided the report to 
the Advisory Council prior to the finalization of its 2011 Annual Report, 
but the selenium report is not mentioned in the Annual Report. 
 Ziemkiewicz based his selenium report on 180 outfalls in West 
Virginia that WVDMR identified that did not meet the less than 4.7 µg/L 
selenium limit.165  The report chose two treatment options based on the 
court’s ruling and selection of treatment in the Patriot case.166  The report 
estimated treatment costs based upon the flow data from the 180 outfalls 
identified by WVDMR.167  The amount of flow from the outfalls 
determines the types of technology that are appropriate for viable 
selenium reduction. 
 Calculations of actual costs took into account direct capital cost for 
installation, indirect capital costs for project management, and operation 
and maintenance for 20 years of operating costs.168  The liability costs for 
selenium treatment alone for the 180 outfalls that did not meet selenium 
WQS range from $1.925 trillion ($133 billion for 125 sites discharging 
under 200 gpm plus $1.792 trillion for 44 sites discharging over 200 
gpm), under a lower confidence limit estimate, to $7.983 trillion ($534 
billion for 125 sites discharging under 200 gpm plus $7.449 trillion for 
55 sites discharging over 200 gpm), under an upper confidence limit, 
with a mean of $3.964 trillion estimated for treatment for 20 years.169  
This estimates the costs for a combination of zero-valent iron and fixed-
bed reactor treatments (based on the gallons per minute needed to 
treat).170  Alternatives for other treatment technologies included zero-
                                                 
 164. Ziemkiewicz, supra note 15, at 1. 
 165. Id. at 1-2. 
 166. See Huffman II, 651 F. Supp. 2d 512 (S.D. W. Va. 2009). 
 167. Ziemkiewicz, supra note 15. 
 168. Id. at 2, 4. 
 169. Id. at 7. 
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valent ion treatment by the company CH2M Hill—with costs from $814 
million to $3.298 billion and a mean of $1.652 billion for 125 sites 
discharging under 200 gpm.171  Reverse osmosis for 55 sites discharging 
over 200 gpm would cost from $2.859 trillion to $10.490 trillion, with a 
mean cost of $4.976 trillion for 20 years of treatment.172 
 The report did not take into account the potential that discharge 
limitations could become stricter (requiring more treatment) for outfalls 
that discharge into water bodies that are now impaired under CWA 
section 303(d) for excessive selenium.  Due to the many years of flagrant 
violations by coal companies, 77 water bodies in West Virginia are now 
impaired by selenium.173  Section 303(d) impairment means that these 
waterbodies will not support the proper water uses (for selenium, those 
streams cannot adequately support aquatic life or human health uses) due 
to their excessive levels of selenium.  Due to existing pollution, mostly 
from mining impacts, the streams exceed WQS. 
 Because the streams exceed WQS, the CWA requires West Virginia 
to implement a watershed Total Maximum Daily Load (TMDL) to 
reduce permit limitations from every source of selenium contributing 
into the watershed, including any unreclaimed mine sites, in order to 
lower the selenium levels of the stream.  This could also cause more sites 
to be in noncompliance, adding to the 180-outfall estimate.  It could also 
increase treatment costs to allow for treatment to remove more selenium 
from water prior to discharge to meet lower limits. 
 The selenium research based the estimates on treatment for 20 
years, whereas the state itself has now estimated it will need at least 35 
years to treat pollution from existing abandoned mine sites for other 
pollutants.  Ziemkiewicz recently finalized research based on one mine 
site in West Virginia.174  Based on that one large mine complex with 67 
outlets using monthly reporting of selenium levels and a watershed study 
in the Mud River, his research estimated that selenium would naturally 
attenuate to existing regulatory water quality levels in 23 years.175  The 
research found that “estimated field selenium concentrations increased to 
a maximum value of 25.8 μg/L within seven years” and “the mine outlet 
                                                 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. 
 173. See W. VA. DEP’T OF ENVTL. PROT., WEST VIRGINIA 2012 DRAFT SECTION 303(D) LIST 
(2012), available at http://www.dep.wv.gov/WWE/watershed/IR/Documents/2012_Draft_303(d)_ 
Documents/2012_303(d)_Complete_Document_M112012.pdf. 
 174. P.F. Ziemkiewicz & R.J. Lovett, Natural Selenium Attenuation at the Lab, Outlet, and 
Watershed Scales, W. VA. MINE DRAINAGE TASK FORCE (2012), http://www.wvmdtaskforce. 
com/proceedings/12/6-Ziemkiewicz-Se-Concnetrations-TF-2012.pdf. 
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study indicated that the average selenium value reached a maximum of 
26.3 μg/L.”176  The existing water quality limit is 5 μg/L.177  Of course, 
that is without a TMDL in place in the Mud River.  A TMDL would 
lower the regulatory limit for discharges to reduce the selenium load in 
the river—most likely significantly. 
 A further limitation of the selenium cost report is that it is based 
only upon a snapshot of selenium violations at one point in time.  
Assuming WVDMR’s data is accurate,178 the report relied only on 
selenium violations as of 2010.  It does not take into account the fact that 
MTR sites are continuously discharging pollutants and that those sites 
could violate selenium limitations in the future.  The number of outfalls 
violating selenium limits will only increase.  MTR persists in West 
Virginia to this day.  Companies are now required to institute more 
extensive overburden handling plans so that selenium is not exposed in 
the process.  Whether it will work remains to be seen, especially because 
those assurances come from the same mine companies that created the 
selenium problem and the state that refused to recognize selenium as an 
issue in the first place. 
 Ziemkiewicz’s report also failed to take into account past sites 
where WVDMR certified the reclamation plans and released the bonds.  
Citizen groups now allege that previously-released sites violate WQS.  
One lawsuit alleged that the current owners of the first MTR site in West 
Virginia, Bullpush Mountain,179 discharge selenium and conductive 
particles in levels that exceed WQS.  Mining was completed and the 
bond was released in 2008.  Although the Bullpush Mountain lawsuit 
was voluntarily dismissed, other lawsuits have been filed against large 
landowning companies like Pocahontas Land Corporation, a subsidiary 
of Norfolk Southern Corporation.180 
                                                 
 176. Id. 
 177. W. VA. CODE R. § 47-2 app. E, tbl.1 (2013). 
 178. Considering that WVDMR failed to include selenium limitations in many of the 
MTR NPDES permits reasonably likely to exceed safe limits and that WVDMR has been largely 
remiss in enforcing selenium limitations due to the sweetheart stays offered to mining companies, 
WVDMR’s 180 outfalls are probably underestimated.  Even assuming that as a result of federal 
lawsuits brought by environmental groups, some of these outfalls will have treatment 
technologies installed, the author’s research has found only one mine site where treatment 
technology has been fully constructed and has successfully met selenium limits.  That site is the 
result of the Arch Coal settlement with the EPA and West Virginia.  See Arch Coal Clean Water 
Act Settlement, supra note 5. 
 179. Ken Ward Jr., New Lawsuits Target Mountaintop Removal Landowners, CHARLESTON 
GAZETTE (May 29, 2013), http://www.wvgazette.com/News/201305290045. 
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VIII. THE STATE IS RESPONSIBLE FOR IMPROPERLY RELEASED SITES 
THAT DO NOT MEET WQS 
 Let us assume that there are a number of sites where, because of 
politics and improper reclamation practices, the bonds were released but 
the sites discharge pollutants above WQS.  What will be done with those 
sites? 
 The Water Fund is not responsible for sites once reclamation is 
approved and the bond is released because the state has terminated its 
jurisdiction under SMCRA.181  WVDMR would likely argue that it does 
not have any obligation or authority to expend funds to reclaim those 
sites because it has lost jurisdiction.  However, because selenium and 
other pollutant discharge problems do not generally just spontaneously 
arise but are the result of improper overburden waste handling and poor 
reclamation practices, it is almost certain that those mine sites discharged 
illegal levels of pollutants in violation of the West Virginia Water 
Pollution Control Act and CWA when WVDMR approved the 
reclamation and released the bond. 
 Using a theory such as Ziemkiewicz’s research on natural pollutant 
attenuation, an environmental group could argue very persuasively that 
the mining company misrepresented its pollutant levels when it requested 
closure.  Under SMCRA, the state must reassert jurisdiction over the site 
if the release “was based upon fraud, collusion, or misrepresentation of a 
material fact.”182  Even if WVDMR refuses to make such a determination, 
an environmental group could file a lawsuit in federal or state court 
seeking a writ of mandamus to force WVDMR to perform its mandatory 
duty, or it could appeal the decision to OSM. 
 A court determines misrepresentation under SMCRA using an 
objective standard, which means the state or an environmental group 
would have to show that a reasonable person would find that the mining 
company intentionally misrepresented that its discharge met WQS.183  
OSM represented to the court in National Wildlife Federation v. Lujan 
that “[i]f an operator applies for release but has not fulfilled his 
obligations, he is guilty of misrepresentation by the very fact of making 
an application.”184  Thus, it seems likely that some of these released sites 
were the product of misrepresentation because the site did not meet WQS 
                                                 
 181. See 30 C.F.R. § 700.11 (2012); see also Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Lujan, 950 F.2d. 765, 
766 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (finding termination of jurisdiction under SMCRA upon release of the 
performance bond a reasonable interpretation of the Act). 
 182. 30 C.F.R. § 700.11(d)(2). 
 183. See Lujan, 950 F.2d. at 770. 
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prior to the application for release.  The state may have to reassert 
jurisdiction.  The site could then become abandoned under SMCRA if 
the original operator refuses to reclaim to WQS or is insolvent.  Without 
a performance bond in place, WVDMR would have to treat the water 
using the Water Fund or enforce against the current landowner, which is 
often a large out-of-state landholding corporation.  To date, WVDMR 
has not enforced against landowners of surface mines.  In 2012, 
WVDMR received only $61,960 in civil penalties from forfeiture sites.185 
 In addition to the CWA violations that a citizen can seek against the 
mine operator or the current landowner, an environmental group may 
also use 30 C.F.R. § 700.11(d)(2) to force WVDMR to reassert SMCRA 
jurisdiction if a coal company likely knew that the site discharged 
selenium at levels in excess of WQS at the time it applied for release.  
The site could then fall under treatment by the Water Fund. 
 It is unclear at this time how many sites exist where WVDMR 
closed and released the bond, but the site continues to discharge illegal 
pollutants.  It is highly unlikely that any of those released sites met WQS 
at the time of closure, given WVDMR’s track record on water pollution 
from surface mining.  WVDMR did not even properly evaluate selenium 
at current sites until forced to by federal court, so it would be improbable 
that it properly evaluated the pollution discharged from postreclamation 
sites.  West Virginia’s outstanding selenium liabilities could easily exceed 
$10 trillion over the next 20 years or longer. 
IX. POTENTIAL FUTURE REQUIREMENTS 
 In addition to selenium liabilities, WVDMR has estimated that 
water liabilities only account for treatment to meet current WQS.  WQS 
may become more stringent in the future (more protective of water uses), 
which would require more expensive treatment at abandoned sites.  This 
is particularly true for watersheds that fall under the 303(d) listing due to 
excessive pollution.  Stricter WQS could also make previously treated 
sites fall into noncompliance.  This added treatment would increase the 
costs to the Water Fund.  The Special Reclamation Advisory Council and 
WVDMR have not taken those risks into account in assessing the Water 
Fund’s viability. 
 One such example is specific conductivity.  Conductivity is the 
measure of salinity in water.186  Conductivity is associated with mixtures 
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of calcium, manganese, sulfate, and bicarbonate salt ions.187  The EPA has 
established through scientific research that elevated levels of 
conductivity are associated with aquatic life impairment.  The EPA 
reported, “Fish, amphibians, mussels, and aquatic macroinvertebrates are 
especially exposed on their gills or other respiratory surfaces that are in 
direct contact with dissolved ions in water.”188  The EPA has also linked 
elevated levels of conductivity to MTR with valley fill operations in 
Appalachia and in West Virginia specifically.189 
 In 2010, the EPA issued guidance on conductivity in West Virginia, 
limiting MTR discharges to 300-500 µS/cm.190  That guidance document 
was challenged in federal court by coal mining associations and the state 
of West Virginia.191  In July 2012, the United States District Court for the 
District of Columbia invalidated that guidance, concluding that the EPA 
had exceeded its statutory authority in promulgating the guidance; the 
science itself was never evaluated by the court.192  The issue is currently 
on appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia. 
 However, concurrent to the EPA ruling, the West Virginia 
Environmental Quality Board (EQB) issued a decision on an NPDES 
permit for Patriot Mining Company that requires WVDMR to implement 
limits on conductivity regardless of the status of the EPA’s guidance.193  
The EQB is a statutorily created administrative board that reviews 
appeals of NPDES permitting and enforcement decisions by WVDEP.194  
The EQB operates independently from WVDEP.195  Each EQB member 
must have knowledge and experience in the state’s water resources.196  
The EQB that issued the conductivity decision consisted of five members 
                                                 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. at 2. 
 189. See id. at viii, xv. 
 190. Press Release, EPA, EPA Issues Comprehensive Guidance To Protect Appalachian 
Communities from Harmful Environment Impacts of Mountaintop Mining (Apr. 1, 2010), 
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 191. See Nat’l Mining Ass’n v. Jackson, 880 F. Supp. 2d 119 (D.D.C. 2012). 
 192. Id. at 142. 
 193. See Sierra Club, Appeal No. 10-34-EQB, at 25-26 (W. Va. Envtl. Quality Bd. July 30, 
2012) (final order), available at http://www.wveqb.org/finalorders/10-34-eqb%20-%20supple 
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 194. See W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 22B-1-1 to -12 (LexisNexis 2010). 
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experienced in water quality regulations with four of the members 
holding doctor of philosophy degrees in science and all five working in 
the field of environmental science.197 
 The EQB’s decision was based upon four days of expert testimony 
that included scientists who published academic research in peer-
reviewed articles on the actual damage to West Virginia streams from 
elevated levels of conductivity.  The experts testified that surface mining 
itself released high concentrations of conductivity through fragmenting 
and exposing rock to surface water.198  Expert witnesses for the Sierra 
Club testified that elevated levels of conductivity correspond to mining 
watersheds impaired for aquatic life.199  High levels of surface mining in 
watersheds correspond to high levels of conductivity.200 
 The Board received testimony that high levels of conductivity 
reduce macroinvertebrate diversity, which is a building block of stream 
biodiversity.201  Without biodiversity in streams, “ecosystem function 
collapses” and stream function is impacted.202  Experts testified that MTR 
mining causes biological impairment in streams for macroinvertebrates 
through the chain to fish, amphibians, and birds.203 
 Based on this testimony, the EQB found that elevated levels of 
conductivity violate the state narrative WQS.  The narrative WQS criteria 
prohibits discharges of “‘[m]aterials in concentrations which are 
harmful . . . to . . . aquatic life’ or that cause ‘significant adverse impacts 
to the . . . biological components of aquatic ecosystems.’”204  As a result, 
when a reasonable potential analysis indicates that a mine’s discharge 
will violate the narrative WQS, WVDMR must impose conductivity 
limits.205  Although the EQB did not set a numeric limitation on 
conductivity, it found that the narrative criteria guides the limitation.  
Thus, all mining sites, including sites on the abandoned mine list under 
the Water Fund, must not discharge materials in amounts that produce 
conductivity levels that result in harm to aquatic life or significant 
adverse impacts to aquatic ecosystems. 
                                                 
 197. Board Members, W. VA. ENVTL. QUALITY BD., http://www.wveqb.org/board.asp (last 
visited Nov. 2, 2013). 
 198. Sierra Club, Appeal No. 10-34-EQB, at 9. 
 199. Id. at 11-12. 
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 This decision was appealed by both WVDMR and Patriot Mining 
Company.  EQB decisions are appealed to the Circuit Court of Kanawha 
County, West Virginia, a state trial court of general jurisdiction, presided 
by judges who are elected through partisan county elections.  The circuit 
court reversed the EQB’s decision on February 13, 2013.206  The court’s 
sole basis for reversal was the D.C. Circuit’s decision that the EPA’s 
guidance was administratively invalid and that the EQB gave no 
deference to WVDMR’s interpretation of the narrative guidance.  The 
court ignored all of the expert testimony received by EQB over the four-
day period and the fact that WVDMR and Patriot failed to adduce any 
expert witnesses to oppose the evidence providing an association 
between conductivity levels, mining, and water quality impairment.  The 
court also ignored the findings of the EQB of actual impairment in 
mining watersheds and the correlation to conductivity. 
 Instead, the court deferred to the WVDMR’s “interpretation of 
water quality standards” and did not address the fact that WVDMR had 
actually failed to interpret the narrative standard.207  WVDMR actually 
did not publish a guidance document until after the NPDES permit was 
approved.  This “guidance” consists of an eight-page document taking a 
“wait and see” approach:  wait until a problem exists in the watershed 
and then threaten the mine companies with limits (similar to the unlawful 
approach taken by WVDMR in selenium).208  There is no scientific 
analysis in the eight-page guidance.  The court also failed to identify how 
the EQB’s finding that WVDMR failed to recognize documented and 
consistent evidence of actual biological impairments in streams where 
high levels of conductivity from surface mining occur was contrary to the 
evidence in the record.209  Instead, the court wrongly relied upon 
inapplicable case law and ignored West Virginia Code section 22B-1-7 
(stating EQB appeals shall be heard de novo) by requiring the EQB to 
                                                 
 206. Patriot Mining Co. v. Sierra Club, Nos. 11-AA-102, 11-AA-104, at 8 (Cir. Ct. of 
Kanawha Cnty., W. Va., Feb. 13, 2013), available at http://www.jacksonkelly.com/pdf/2-13-
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defer to WVDEP’s eight-page guidance.  The court wrongly focused on 
the role of the EPA on state permitting, even though the EPA did not 
impose conductivity requirements in this case, the EPA had approved the 
permit without conductivity limits, and the EPA was not a party to the 
case before the EQB or the court.210 
 The court never found any grounds to exclude or ignore expert 
testimony on conductivity and its effects.  The court needed to find that 
WVDMR’s expertise contradicted the expert testimony in order to defer 
to WVDMR, but the court wholly failed to address this issue.  The court 
also found that the EQB tried to establish de facto effluent limitations 
when the EQB expressly did not impose any numeric limits.211  In its 
actual order, the EQB merely directed WVDMR to use the available 
scientific evidence on conductivity to establish a limit necessary to 
protect the narrative standard, which WVDMR is statutorily required to 
do.212  In light of the extensive expert testimony adduced during the four 
days and the fact that the court used the wrong standard of review by 
solely attacking the EPA’s guidance and requiring deference to WVDEP, 
this case was appealed and is pending before the Supreme Court of 
Appeals of West Virginia. 
 At this time, it is not known what levels of conductivity would 
violate the West Virginia narrative standard.  However, the EPA’s 
guidance provides strong scientific evidence linking conductivity to 
impairment of aquatic life.  The science behind the EPA’s conductivity 
guidance was not invalidated and should be used by mining regions in 
the absence of scientific evidence-based research by the states.  
Conductivity treatment may increase the liabilities for the Water Fund 
significantly. 
 Counsel for mining companies that operate West Virginia surface 
mines, including Patriot Mining Company in the EQB conductivity case, 
have argued that the mining industry cannot achieve conductivity levels 
without using “reverse osmosis—a technology not affordable to the 
surface mining industry.”213  Other counsel for mining companies have 
argued that reverse osmosis and evaporation/crystallization will reduce 
conductivity, but are “very expensive to build and operate,” requiring 
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large areas of space for installation.214  If complying with conductivity 
limits is not financially feasible for the for-profit surface mining industry, 
it cannot be financially feasible for the state and its $9.4 million Water 
Fund. 
 WVDMR and the Special Reclamation Advisory Council have not 
researched the potential risks for conductivity treatment at abandoned 
sites.  However, in his research on selenium, Ziemkiewicz included the 
cost for reverse osmosis technology as an option for the removal of 
selenium.215  According to counsel for coal companies in West Virginia, 
the same reverse osmosis technology would be used for conductivity 
treatment.  Cost estimates by Ziemkiewicz for reverse osmosis to meet 
selenium WQS could vary from the cost estimates to treat to conductivity 
WQS.  However, Ziemkiewicz’s estimates are a reasonable beginning 
estimate of the risk of liability West Virginia faces for conductivity 
treatment at abandoned mine sites. 
 Ziemkiewicz estimated that for 55 outlets, treatment using reverse 
osmosis would cost at least $2.859 trillion for 20 years of treatment, with 
a maximum estimate of $10.490 trillion for 20 years of treatment.216  The 
mean cost of treating 55 outlets would be $4.976 trillion.217  These 
estimates do not take into account the cost of site access, site preparation, 
construction of flow equalization ponds, water diversions, or the cost of 
bringing electrical power into the remote surface mine sites, which are 
also significant costs.218 
 Conductivity pollution is more widespread than selenium.  
Violations of selenium WQS are limited to selenium-bearing coal seams.  
The EPA has designated the entire coalfield area in the state of West 
Virginia as subject to the conductivity benchmark of 300-500 µS/cm.219  
Moreover, the EQB’s ruling applies to all NPDES permitting within the 
state.  Because WVDMR did not require conductivity limits or even 
                                                 
 214. Robert Stonestreet, Stream Conductivity:  It’s Not Just a Mining Issue, POWER MAG. 
(Feb. 1, 2011), http://www.coalpowermag.com/commentary/Stream-Conductivity-Its-Not-Just-a-
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levels that would harm freshwater aquatic life.  Needless to say, West Virginia has not promulga-
ted seawater aquatic life water quality standards.  This author has oceanfront property in West 
Virginia to sell Mr. Stonestreet if he truly believes this comment to his clients.  Mr. Stonestreet 
also astutely points out that Gatorade exceeds the conductivity levels for EPA’s aquatic life 
protections as well.  Although not a product liability practitioner, this author would advise Mr. 
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 215. Ziemkiewicz, supra note 15, at 1. 
 216. Id. at 7. 
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sampling of surface mining outlets until recently under its NPDES 
program, the number of outlets in violation of WQS for the narrative 
criteria is unknown at this time.  Given that the problems identified by 
the EPA’s analysis appear to be more widespread than the problems 
identified with selenium, it is reasonable to assume that significantly 
more than 55 outlets are in noncompliance with West Virginia WQS for 
conductivity.  Thus, West Virginia’s risk of liability for reverse osmosis to 
treat conductivity could easily exceed $10.490 trillion over 20 years of 
treatment. 
X. LEGAL COSTS 
 In addition to the basic treatment, operating, and administrative 
costs associated with the state operating as an NPDES permittee, other 
significant costs may increase the liability to the Water Fund.  Now that 
West Virginia is a permittee, it also has the risk of enforcement that is 
inherent to all NPDES permittees who violate the terms of their NPDES 
permits.  The Special Reclamation Advisory Council has failed to take 
into account the cost for the state to defend itself against citizen suits for 
the state’s failure to meet WQS at abandoned surface mine sites. 
 When the state does not meet WQS in a reasonable amount of time, 
the risk of a suit by citizens will increase.  When a lawsuit is filed against 
West Virginia for violations of the CWA, the state will then feel the 
pressure that citizen groups like West Virginia Highlands Conservancy, 
Ohio Valley Environmental Coalition, and the Sierra Club have exerted 
on the coal industry in the past decade. 
 The amount of money that coal companies (and their insurers) have 
paid law firms is not public information, and any ballpark figure would 
be unreliable conjecture.  However, West Virginia has been involved in a 
number of high-profile cases where it has defended itself and the coal 
industry from challenges by citizen groups and the EPA.  The private law 
firm of Bailey & Glasser LLP represents WVDMR in coal mining 
related litigation, rather than state attorneys in the Office of Legal 
Services at WVDEP or the West Virginia Attorney General.220  Bailey & 
Glasser’s representation of WVDMR is exempt from the bidding process 
that normally accompanies contractor work with the state. 
 Bailey & Glasser has represented WVDMR intermittently since 
Bragg v. Robertson in 1999221 and continues to represent WVDMR, most 
                                                 
 220. Benjamin L. Bailey, BAILEY & GLASSER, http://www.baileyglasser.com/people/ 
Benjamin-Bailey.htmx (last visited Oct. 28, 2013). 
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recently in the challenge to the EPA conductivity guidance (which 
continues in litigation on federal appeal) and with issues arising from 
Patriot Coal’s recent bankruptcy.222  Bailey & Glasser also jointly 
represented WVDMR in the losses in federal court requiring NPDES 
permitting of abandoned surface mine sites. 
 From a review of warrants paid through the West Virginia State 
Auditor’s Office, WVDEP has paid Bailey & Glasser over $2.3 million 
for work over a period of 6 years (1999 to 2003 and 2010 to present).223  
If Bailey & Glasser continues its representation in issues related to 
bonding, reclamation, and surface mining, then those attorney’s fees will 
likely increase. 
 It is unclear from what fund WVDMR would pay for its own 
representation in enforcement actions against itself—the Water Fund or a 
WVDMR Fund.  Because the Office of Legal Services plays the role of 
enforcer for all state CWA enforcement litigation, it is possible that 
WVDMR would use outside counsel like Bailey & Glasser to defend 
itself in the role of violator.  The argument should be made that 
enforcement penalties and attorney’s fees constitute part of the cost for 
remediation and should be paid from the Water Fund.  The surface coal 
mining industry should pay for those costs through the Special 
Reclamation Bond Program and the Water Fund tax, not taxpayers 
through WVDMR’s state budget. 
XI. FUTURE VIABILITY OF THE WATER FUND 
 West Virginia’s SRF and Water Fund are essentially pyramid 
schemes.  Liabilities are funded based upon the ludicrous presumption 
that mining will increase through time and continue far into the future at 
sustainable levels.  Taxes that are paid on extracted coal today pay for 
liabilities from forfeitures 20 years ago.  Likewise, whatever taxes are 
paid in the future will pay for the existing liabilities created by mine sites 
permitted today and those forfeited in the future.  When the coal industry 
declines, so will the taxes paid into the Water Fund.  West Virginia may 
currently be at the zenith of the amount of money going into the Water 
Fund.  Like Wimpy in Popeye, the coal companies have gladly promised 
to pay West Virginia tomorrow for their pollution today. 
 In 2012, the Consensus Coal Production and Price Forecast for West 
Virginia (2012 Consensus) estimated that coal extraction in the state will 
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decrease from 134.6 million tons mined in 2011 to 96 million tons by 
2020.224  This reduction represents a loss of 38.6 million tons, so West 
Virginia would receive $5.79 million less in 2020 for the Water Fund 
(using the current tax rates).  The 2012 Consensus estimate is significant 
because it reflects a severe drop in estimated coal mined in West Virginia 
from estimates even a year earlier.  In 2012, the prospects for the coal 
economy in West Virginia reflected a more dramatic drop in production 
in a shorter period of time—a decade shorter than the 2011 estimates 
(which also predicted significant decreases in the coal market).  The 
2012 coal market dropped 6.5% in the first quarter of 2012 compared to 
the first quarter of 2011.225 
 The decline in the tax money going into the Water Fund is 
significant in light of current actuarial reports.  The 2012 actuarial report 
found that the Water Fund would be depleted by 2037, using current tax 
rates and assuming that no expenditures from the Water Fund would 
occur until 2019.226  However, the Water Fund had assets of $8.7 million 
in 2011; in 2012, even after six months of increased taxes, the Water 
Fund held $9.4 million, an increase of only $700,000, despite over 100 
million tons of coal mined in West Virginia.227  This amount indicates that 
money is currently being expended from the Water Fund, despite the 
calculations in the actuarial report.228  In the 2011 actuarial report, 
WVDMR stated that it would continue to pay for water liabilities from 
the general SRF and not use the Water Fund until June 2018 in order to 
allow the Water Fund to build assets.229  So it is unclear how the Water 
Fund would remain solvent until 2037 if solvency was based upon no 
spending until 2019.  With current expenditures and little gains in the 
Water Fund, it seems likely that the Water Fund will become insolvent 
much sooner than predicted. 
 The money in the Water Fund does not even come close to paying 
for existing liabilities, and it is certain that it cannot pay for future 
liabilities either.  Fewer tons mined means that the Water Fund will 
decrease continuously through 2020, using current tax rates, while new 
                                                 
 224. GEORGE W. HAMMOND, W. VA. UNIV., CONSENSUS COAL PRODUCTION AND PRICE 
FORECAST FOR WEST VIRGINIA:  2012 UPDATE 1 (2012). 
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 226. Special Reclamation Advisory Council, supra note 18, at 6. 
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reclamation sites will increase steadily, even in ideal economic 
conditions. 
XII. CONCLUSION 
 West Virginia created a scheme whereby it continuously approved 
mining permits that resulted in perpetual water pollution that impairs 
aquatic life.  Then it systematically underbonded these same polluting 
sites, ignoring the known risks and the costs to reclaim those risks.  Next, 
it undertaxed the entire mining industry for the Water Fund that was 
supposed to be the fail-safe program to back up its woefully underfunded 
bond system.  As the final insult to the citizens of West Virginia, when 
faced with raising the tax rates on the coal industry, WVDMR instead 
denied that it had to meet WQS because, unlike every other discharger in 
the entire United States, it argued that it maintained some sort of special 
status because it had no money due to purposely underfunding itself 
rather than making the mining industry pay for its pollution from its 
booming coal-mining business. 
 It is disheartening to know that a state whose legacy recognizes that 
coal companies abused and took advantage of the state’s miners for 
decades through harsh labor conditions not only allowed but also 
encouraged and facilitated coal companies to abuse and take advantage 
of its taxpayers under the guise of economic development, energy, and 
jobs.  West Virginia miners unionized and fought against company scrip, 
payable only in the mining company’s store, only for the state to accept 
the equivalent of scrip—worthless or underfunded bonds and taxation 
systems—to ensure the health of its citizens and environment. 
 Political theory accurately explains what has occurred in West 
Virginia.  West Virginia became an “environmental sacrifice zone,” by 
providing cheap power to the country and increasing the profits of coal 
barons at the expense of its own environment and communities.230  The 
environmental impacts facilitated by the improper mining permitting and 
bonding processes from the 1970s to present fits Robert Nixon’s 
description of “slow violence,” a delayed destruction spread over space 
and time, not typically perceived as violence at all, but resulting in 
environmental degradation inflicted upon the poor.231  The social 
constructs and political processes aligned in what John Gaventa 
described as power and powerlessness in the history of the Appalachian 
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Valley since coal was first discovered.232  The power of absentee 
landowners with coal interests shifted the balance from the need for 
consent from the governed to the absentee landowners governing the 
consent of men.233  The state and the EPA’s refusal to meaningfully 
enforce against flagrant violations by coal mines is environmental 
injustice against the people of West Virginia.234  Mining technologies may 
have improved to allow more coal extraction, but results haven’t changed 
since the mining industry entered West Virginia over a century ago.  The 
citizens of West Virginia pay for the wealth of absentee coal owners. 
 Even worse than financial ruin, citizens warned the state that MTR 
was seriously affecting their health for years.  Now, emerging academic 
research indicates through peer-reviewed scientific evidence that 
residents in areas near MTR sites suffer from illnesses with more 
prevalence than nonmining Appalachian areas.235 
 This Article addresses the reality that West Virginia faces very 
serious fiscal and environmental problems from surface mining.  These 
problems must be addressed within the next decade.  The problems in 
bonding amounts must be resolved prior to the insolvency of mine 
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operators.  The recent increase of the Special Reclamation Tax does not 
address the liabilities from future bond forfeitures combined with a 
decreasing mined tonnage and the resulting reduction in taxable coal. 
 WVDMR chronically failed to (1) adequately tax and require 
reclamation bonds from mining companies that sufficiently covered the 
risk of environmental damage caused by mining and (2) apply WQS to 
mining sites.  The West Virginia legislature blatantly refused to increase 
the amount of the coal reclamation tax or the reclamation bond ceilings.  
As a result, West Virginia allowed coal companies to inundate its water 
bodies with illegal quantities of pollutants without adequate financial 
assurance to remediate the sites to clean up the polluted streams in the 
event coal companies abandoned those sites.  West Virginia also failed to 
adequately consider that MTR sites would need permanent water 
treatment for perpetual discharges of pollutants and that the coal 
companies were not sufficiently bonded or financially solvent to pay for 
the risk of perpetual water treatment. 
 What could West Virginia do to improve the status of the Water 
Fund?  It looks as though it could be entirely too late to fix the problems 
that decades of mismanagement and corporate greed have created.  The 
pollution created from MTR cannot be undone.  West Virginia must 
strike immediately in order to secure as much money as it can from the 
coal industry before the industry skips out on West Virginia. 
 West Virginia must reassess all existing reclamation bonds.  Clearly, 
the bonds have no basis in reality to estimate the risk of liabilities.  
Reclamation bonds based upon acres mined makes absolutely no sense 
with regards to water liabilities.  Just as Ziemkiewicz estimated in his 
report, West Virginia should base bonding on the gallons-per-minute flow 
of water that will be discharged from the site.  The legislature should 
require WVDMR to take the amount of the highest potential cost of 
treatment technology and fully bond that amount.  That is the only way to 
comply with the requirements of financial assurance under SMCRA and 
ensure that future abandoned sites requiring treatment do not end up as 
liabilities for the Water Fund. 
 West Virginia must “gather ye rosebuds while ye may.”236  The state 
needs to fund the Water Fund and the bonding program as much as 
possible now while the coal industry remains solvent.  The recent 
legislative Special Reclamation Tax increase does very little to improve 
the status of the Water Fund.  The Special Reclamation Tax does not take 
into account the reality that the state’s entire budget will significantly 
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decrease as coal mining decreases.  The state will need to reduce its 
budget across the board and cannot afford to redirect other money into 
the Water Fund. 
 West Virginia needs to get out of the business of managing the 
Water Fund and assessing surety bonds by privatizing the venture.  Let 
the coal industry find and pay for a capable financial institution to insure 
the long-term effects of MTR.  A financial institution should bear the 
burden of financial risk of wholesale implosion of the coal industry.  
Even aside from the SRF and Water Fund, West Virginia’s track record on 
managing trust funds and insurance is deplorable.  The state of West 
Virginia mismanaged the Worker’s Compensation system (now 
privatized), the Underground Storage Tank Fund (now defunct), the 
teachers’ pension fund (underfunded), and the state employees’ pension 
fund (underfunded).  The fact that the legislature has maintained this 
Special Reclamation rouse in the face of repeated failures of the state in 
other financial endeavors is incredible. 
 These problems with the Water Fund must be addressed before the 
industry is significantly impacted by a decrease in mining.  Even more 
disconcerting is that the state continues to permit new mines, even 
though it knows that the significant risks for water treatment exist and 
are not ameliorated in new surface mine operations, particularly MTR 
with valley fill sites.  WVDMR has overwhelming, certain, and 
uncontroverted evidence that perpetual postmining pollution discharges 
result from MTR and continues to permit MTR under SMCRA.  
WVDMR must stop permitting surface mining sites that result in 
perpetual water pollutant discharges.  WVDMR permits today the future 
abandoned, polluting mine sites of tomorrow. 
 West Virginia has not met its obligations under federal SMCRA for 
financial assurance.  As a result, the state now faces discharges from 
hundreds of sites that do not meet WQS without the financial resources 
to treat these sites.  Under SMCRA, West Virginia’s authority under 
SMCRA can be revoked for these failures, and OSM can enforce 
existing permits and issue new permits in its place.  This Article 
establishes a plethora of reasons why OSM should revoke West Virginia’s 
SMCRA authority due to a chronic failure to properly bond and seek 
financial assurance “to protect society and the environment from the 
adverse effects of surface coal mining operations,” as set forth in 
SMCRA.237  Other reasons for revocation, such as inadequate 
enforcement of CWA and SMCRA violations at MTR sites, failure to 
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properly evaluate cumulative hydrologic impact assessments (CHIAs), 
and failure to properly certify that MTR sites would meet state WQS 
under section 401 of the CWA may exist, but are not addressed by this 
Article and should be the subject of further research. 
 This Article also raises the question of what have we learned from 
MTR permitting and bonding in West Virginia?  Political decisions are 
not made using rational decision making, particularly when a powerful 
lobby like coal mining directs the conversation.  Political influences can 
outweigh the need for serious investigation into potential problems and 
eliminate any thought of foresight.  The EPA, OSM, the Army Corps of 
Engineers, and WVDMR did little to nothing for more than a decade 
while water quality declined and liabilities piled up.  All of the checks 
and balances in the SMCRA system failed the citizens of West Virginia.  
Only the federal courts, with judges secure in lifetime appointments and 
largely free from political pressures, prompted by citizens concerned for 
the environment and the health of themselves and their neighbors, have 
moved to force the coal industry to comply with the explicit requirements 
of SMCRA and the CWA.   
 Citizens must continue to exert pressure on industry and the state 
through the federal judiciary.  Any time that any industry emerges to use 
the state’s natural resources and impact its environment, West Virginians 
and the rest of the country cannot rely upon the state’s assurances that the 
practice is safe or that the costs will be paid.  A person does not have to 
believe in environmentalism, in climate change, in adverse health effects 
from MTR and the burning of coal, or the importance of a healthy 
benthic community to see that MTR is a financial plague on West 
Virginia.  MTR in West Virginia is the most expensive form of corporate 
welfare in the United States. 
 This Article establishes the potentially trillion-dollar debt the coal 
industry will certainly impose on West Virginia.  The only question is 
how many more years, with newly filled streams and additional blown-
up mountains, West Virginia has before this debt comes due.  The coal 
industry wrote an expensive check that the state can never cash, at the 
expense of West Virginia’s environment and its people.  As a result, West 
Virginia, through its complete acquiescence to the desires of the coal 
industry, has burdened future generations of West Virginians with debts 
and pollution it cannot possibly afford.  In essence, West Virginia’s 
politicians have privatized profits to the benefit of Fortune 500 
companies like Massey Energy Company, Alpha Natural Resources, and 
Patriot Coal Corporation, while socializing the costs to burden one of the 
poorest and generally worst-off states in the country. 
